Political economy of taxation,debt ceilings,and growth

This study presents voting on policies, including labor and capital income taxes and public debt, in an overlapping-generations model with physical and human capital accumulation, and analyzes the effects of a debt ceiling on a government's policy formation and its impact on growth and welfare. The results show that the debt ceiling induces the government to shift the tax burdens from the older to younger generations, but stimulates physical capital accumulation and may increase public education expenditure, resulting in a higher growth rate. Alternatively, the debt ceiling is measured from the viewpoint of a benevolent planner and lowering the debt ceiling (i.e., tightening fiscal discipline) makes it possible for the government to approach the planner's allocation in an aging society.     

INFORMATION AGGREGATION,GROWTH, AND FRANCHISE EXTENSION WITH APPLICATIONS TO FEMALE ENFRANCHISEMENT AND INEQUALITY

We develop a model of voluntary gradual franchise extension and growth based on the idea that voting is an information aggregation mechanism. A larger number of voters means that more correct decisions are made, hence increasing output, but also implies that any incremental output must be shared among more individuals. These conflicting incentives lead to a dynamic model of franchise extensions that is consistent with several real world episodes, including female enfranchisement. The model also predicts that in certain circumstances growth and enfranchisement will be accompanied by Kuznets curve type behaviour in inequality. Contrary to the preceding literature these conclusions do not rest on incentives for strategic delegation.     

Trade Liberalization and Environmental Taxation in Federal Systems

The literature on trade liberalization and environment has not yet considered federal structures. In this paper, we show how the design of environmental policy in a federal system has implications for the effects of trade reform. Trade liberalization leads to a decline in pollution taxes, regardless of whether pollution taxes are set at the federal (centralized) or local (decentralized) level, and it increases social welfare. The effect under a decentralized system is smaller than if these taxes are set by the federal government, and pollution emissions therefore decline in this case. Moreover, majority bias interacts with trade liberalization if federal taxes are used.     

Fiscal Subsidy Policy on Home Appliances: Its Effects on Domestic Consumption and Exports in China

This paper evaluates the effects of the Home Appliances Going to the Countryside (HAGC) policy, a fiscal subsidy program implemented in China to boost private consumption of home appliances in rural areas from 2007 to 2012. Using the policy as a natural experiment and employing the difference‐in‐difference estimator, we find that the policy did not increase domestic sales of relevant goods as expected; instead, it actually reduced domestic sales and significantly promoted exports. These surprising results are robust across regressions of alternative datasets, more controls, and different regions. We further provide detailed information of undisclosed audit data for a county in Zhejiang province to shed light on the underlying mechanism of such unexpected results, suggesting loopholes in the HAGC and changes in export tax rebate rates.     

Neighbors and the evolution of the comparative advantage of nations: Evidence of international knowledge diffusion?

The literature on knowledge diffusion shows that knowledge decays strongly with distance. In this paper we document that the probability that a product is added to a country's export basket is, on average, 65% larger if a neighboring country is a successful exporter of that same product. For existing products, growth of exports in a country is 1.5% higher per annum if it has a neighbor with comparative advantage in these products. While these results could be driven by a common third factor that escapes our controls, they align with our expectations of the localized character of knowledge diffusion.     

Direct Democracy and Local Public Finances under Cooperative Federalism

In this paper, we exploit the introduction of the right of local initiatives in the German state of Bavaria in 1995 in order to study the fiscal effects of direct democracy. Our identification strategy combines difference‐in‐differences and regression discontinuity methods: we compare municipal expenditure and revenue between pre‐ and post‐reform periods at population thresholds where the signatures needed to launch initiatives and minimum quorum requirements decrease discontinuously (difference‐in‐discontinuities design). The results suggest that stronger direct democratic institutions lead to an expansion of local government size.     

Intergenerational Correlations of Extreme Right‐Wing Party Preferences and Attitudes toward Immigration

In this paper, we analyze the importance of parental socialization on the development of children's far right‐wing preferences and attitudes toward immigration. Using longitudinal data from Germany, our intergenerational estimates suggest that the strongest and most important predictor for young people's right‐wing extremism are their parents' right‐wing extremist attitudes. While intergenerational associations in attitudes toward immigration are equally high for sons and daughters, we find a positive intergenerational transmission of right‐wing extremist party affinity for sons, but not for daughters. Compared to the intergenerational correlation of other party affinities, the high association between fathers' and sons' right‐wing extremist attitudes is particularly striking.     

Determinants of discretionary fiscal policy in Central and Eastern Europe

This paper explores economic, political and institutional determinants of discretionary fiscal policy in 11 Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries from 2000 to 2013 and compares discretionary fiscal reactions before and during the global economic crisis. We find that fiscal policy was procyclical to the output gap both before and during the crisis, while no fiscal reaction to the absorption gap was captured. Our results also indicate a negative relationship between the level of public debt and deficits over the entire period and the pre-crisis period, suggesting that rising public debt represented a brake on future deficits. We also find that election cycles affect the fiscal deficit, but only during the pre-crisis period, while no evidence of a relationship between fiscal policy and government fragmentation was captured. We find some evidence that in the pre-crisis period the CEE countries with a fixed exchange rate regime ran lower deficits than those with a floating regime, whereas during the crisis no impact of the exchange rate regime on the fiscal deficit was found. There is also some evidence that an arrangement with the IMF was associated with lower deficits for the entire sample period. However, no impact of EU accession on the fiscal stance was identified.     

REGULATION STRATEGIES FOR THE PROVISION OF PATERNALISTIC GOODS

In this study, we analyze the regulation of markets for the provision of services whose costs are subsidized for paternalistic reasons. We model the choice of a benevolent regulator who wants to maximize consumer welfare in a setting where quality cannot be verified and the good provided is fully subsidized. The choice is thus made between two types of providers (profit maximizers and altruistic providers) and two frameworks (monopoly franchise and quality competition). Our analysis shows that in this environment the performance of mixed markets is always dominated by pure forms. Moreover, although making efficient providers compete for the market minimizes cost, the choice of quality competition with altruistic providers may be preferable from a welfare point of view whenever service quality is relevant and the productivity differential is not substantial.     

The stained China miracle: Corruption,regulation, and firm performance

Regional corruptness in China has a positive effect on the profitability of private firms, but not that of state-owned firms. A natural experiment of exogenous trade policy change suggests that corruption may help private firms circumvent government regulation.